Many people today believe that scientific and religious approaches to morality are mutually incompatible. Militant secularists claim scientific backing for their claim that the evolution of morality discredits religious conceptions of ethics. Some of their opponents respond with unhelpful apologetics based on fundamentalist views of revelation. This article attempts to provide an alternative option. It argues that public discussion has been excessively influenced by polemics generated by the new atheists. Religious writers have too often resorted to overly simplistic arguments rooted (...) in literalist approaches to the Bible and the religious traditions. More historically conscious methods can avoid implausible claims about both religion and science. (shrink)

E. O. Wilson offers descriptive and normative analyses of morality. Regarding sciencee as the only proper basis for explaining and developing morality, he has not sufficiently accounted for the complexity of human conduct in this arena. Wilson's account of evolved proclivities, however, indicates important features of human nature that moral theorists ignore at their peril.

E. O. Wilson offers descriptive and normative analyses of morality. Regarding sciencee as the only proper basis for explaining and developing morality, he has not sufficiently accounted for the complexity of human conduct in this arena. Wilson's account of evolved proclivities, however, indicates important features of human nature that moral theorists ignore at their peril.

Can the origins of morality be explained entirely in evolutionary terms? If so, what are the implications for Christian moral theology and ethics? Is the latter redundant, as socio-biologists often assert? Stephen Pope argues that theologians need to engage with evolutionary theory rather than ignoring it. He shows that our growing knowledge of human evolution is compatible with Christian faith and morality, provided that the former is not interpreted reductionistically and the latter is not understood in fundamentalist ways. Christian ethics (...) ought to incorporate evolutionary approaches to human nature to the extent that they provide helpful knowledge of the conditions of human flourishing, both collective and individual. From this perspective, a strong affirmation of human dignity and appreciation for the theological virtues of faith, hope and charity is consistent with a revised account of natural law and the cardinal virtues. (shrink)

This paper traces three paradigmatic responses to the presence of evil in nature. Thomas Henry Huxley depicts nature as the enemy of humanity that morality combats “at every step.” Henry Drummond views nature as benevolent, a friend of humanity, and the ultimate basis for morality. The paper argues that a third view, that of Thomas Aquinas, regards nature as creation, capable of being neither enemy nor friend of humanity but rather the context within which relations of enmity or friendship develop (...) between human beings and God. (shrink)

This paper addresses a nonspecialist audience on how sociobiological accounts of human nature might be relevant to Christian theology. I begin with some confessional remarks to clarify what I mean by Christian theology and how I understand it to be related to science. I indicate briefly why sociobiology might be of interest to theology and then move on to sketch some ways in which sociobiology might relate to theological ethics. My basic point is that sociobiology is directly relevant to theological (...) ethics in its understanding of evolved human emotional predispositions but not in its normative reflection proper. (shrink)

Theological ethics can interpret the relation between evolution and morality in at least three ways. The reductionist approach holds that morality emerges because it is adaptive. The independent approach maintains that morality develops without registering the influence of evolution. Finally, the interdependence position holds that morality reflects the influence of evolution to the extent that the latter shapes human emotional capacities and predispositions, for example, those regarding reciprocity and kin preference. The third approach is more suitable for theological ethics, which (...) attends to ways in which natural desires can be ordered to serve morality, for example, to be habituated to virtue, and to ways in which we must strive to curb or minimize their disruptive effects on human communities. (shrink)

The following represents excerpts from a transcription of the informal discussion that ensued after Stephen Pope and Philip Hefner delivered the preceding papers at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in Washington, D.C., 20 February 2000. These excerpts are presented with a minimum of editing, to preserve the extemporaneous, informal, oral character of the conversation. The excerpts end with a fragmentary comment by E. O. Wilson, conveying the spirit of the actual conversation, which was (...) halted when the allotted time had elapsed and the sense of the group was that areas had been opened up for further conversation that could not be continued at this meeting. (shrink)

Natural law ethicists have typically argued that homosexual activity is immoral because it is "unnatural." Recent scientific information and theories, on the other hand, have been used to challenge this description and to provide moral backing for sexual activity among homosexuals. This paper traces some of the recent scientific claims about possible natural bases of homosexuality and then examines what significance these claims might have for several contemporary forms of natural law ethics. It argues that natural law assessments ought to (...) develop a careful and informed account of whether or to what extent homosexual activity can contribute to integral human flourishing rather than focusing on its status as " natural " or "unnatural" per se. (shrink)